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Investigative Detention: A Search/
Seizure by Any Other Name?
Hon. Justice Casey Hill

I. INTRODUCTION
The common law interpretation of a constable’s duties and powers,
resulting in a non-legislative ancillary powers doctrine, has more or less
been broadly criticized, especially insofar as the recognition of an authority
to investigatively detain a person. 1 The judicial importation of the
Waterfield2 analysis as the foundation for investigative detention sees
the courts as both the creator of the detention power and definer of its
contours within the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 context
of arbitrary detention prohibited by section 9 of the Charter.
While undoubtedly enhancing section 9 Charter standards by
interpreting the prohibition against arbitrary detention in accordance with
equality principles animating section 15(1) of the Charter would serve
to counter both abusive and over-inclusive exercises of investigative



Superior Court of Justice, Ontario.
J. Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention
After Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299; D.M. Tanovich, “E-Racing Racial Profiling” (2004) 41 Alta.
L. Rev. 905; A. Young, “All Along the Watchtower: Arbitrary Detention and the Police Function”
(1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 329; S. Coughlan, “Search Based on Articulable Cause: Proceed With
Caution or Full Stop?” (2002) 2 C.R. (6th) 49; T. Quigley, “Brief Investigative Detentions: A Critique
of R. v. Simpson” (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 935.
2
R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, [1964] 1 Q.B. 164, at 166 (C.A.) requiring the
Court to consider whether the constable’s conduct was prima facie an unlawful interference with
the individual’s liberty or property and, if so, whether such conduct falls within the general scope of
any duty imposed by statute or recognized at common law and whether such conduct, albeit within
the general scope of such a duty, involved an unjustifiable use of police powers associated with the
duty. The Waterfield approach, accepted in R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, 20 C.C.C. (3d) 97,
at 115-16 (S.C.C.), was applied by Doherty J.A. in R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C.
(3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.) to define a police officer’s power to investigatively detain a suspect. Prior to
the decision in R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.) recognizing such a
common law authority, the Simpson case had been adopted in every province: see M. Fairburn,
“Mann Oh Man — We’ve Only Just Begun” (2005) 17 N.J.C.L. 171, at 172-73.
3
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[hereinafter “the Charter”].
1
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detention,4 the choice to settle investigative detention into a section 9
analysis alone, and not a section 8 search/seizure analysis may, at some
point, require rethinking.
In the seminal case of Hunter v. Southam,5 Dickson J. (as he then
was) observed that the section 8 Charter right textually carrying an
unreasonableness standard otherwise had no historical, political or
philosophical context providing any obvious gloss on the guarantee,
unlike the U.S. Fourth Amendment with its “advantage” of a number of
articulated prerequisites.6 Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution with a
guarantee that everyone has a right “to be secure in their persons”,7 and
no arbitrary detention equivalent, has led to the American courts dealing
with investigative detention as a search and seizure issue.8
Early on in our Charter experience, random vehicle stop jurisprudence,
arbitrary detention scenarios justified by section 1 Charter analysis, and
therefore not true investigative detention situations based on reasonable
grounds to suspect, rejected search and seizure scrutiny in favour of
section 9 Charter analysis.9

4
D.M. Tanovich, “Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an
Equality-Based Conception of Arbitrary Detention” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 145.
5
Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam
Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”].
6
Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 at 105 (S.C.C.). In Thomson
Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, 54 C.C.C. (3d) 417, at 449 (S.C.C.), Wilson J. (dissenting in
the result) described s. 8 of the Charter as “totally lacking in specificity”. Justice La Forest, in R. v.
Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136, at 153 (S.C.C.), stated that s. 8 “unlike many
of the other Charter provisions is not qualified by express circumstances, such as, for example, s. 9
which protects everyone arbitrarily detained or imprisoned”. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
7
U.S. Const., amend. IV.
8
Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, at 2403, 2405, 2407 (2007) (“When a police officer
makes a traffic stop, the driver of the car is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”:
p. 2403). “[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has ‘seized’ that person”: Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, at 16 (1968); C. Slobogin, “Let’s Not
Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev.
1053, at 1068 (“holding that a stop is not a ‘seizure’ clearly does violence to the normal meaning of
the word”).
9
In R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, 40 C.C.C. (3d) 398 (S.C.C.), the Court answered
the following stated constitutional question “No”: “whether the spot check procedure, whereby the
police officer required the surrender for inspection of the driver’s licence and insurance card,
infringed the right to be secure against unreasonable search guaranteed by s. 8 of the Charter”
(at 401 C.C.C.). The Court held, at 410 C.C.C.:
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With the common law recognition, many would say development, of
investigative detention, the courts continued to distance the constitutional
analysis from section 8, staying with the trend established in random/
arbitrary detention cases. The vehicle/driver stop jurisprudence relating
to arbitrariness concerned itself with unfettered discretion, randomness
and action other than in accord with fixed standards. This is quite different
than police conduct measured against the standard of targeted necessity
of “reasonable grounds to suspect” integral to investigative detention.10
Accordingly, it is not readily apparent why section 9 has occupied the
entire constitutional field in assessing the investigative detention topic.
It is evident that the exclusive section 9 approach to detention tends
to fall down when one considers the situation where, in the decision to
detain, however defined, the probable cause standard is not met only at
In my opinion, the demand by the police officer, pursuant to the above legislative provisions,
that the appellant surrender his driver’s licence and insurance card for inspection did not
constitute a search within the meaning of s. 8 because it did not constitute an intrusion on a
reasonable expectation of privacy: cf. Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984), 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, 11
D.L.R. (4th) 641, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. There is no such intrusion where a person is required
to produce a licence or permit or other documentary evidence of a status or compliance with
some legal requirement that is a lawful condition of the exercise of a right or privilege.
Similarly, in R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, 56 C.C.C. (3d) 22 (S.C.C.), the Court rejected
(at 45 C.C.C.) a s. 8 Charter application in light of the narrow question before the court:
Is section 189a(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 198, as amended by s. 2 of
the Highway Traffic Amendment Act, 1981 (No. 3), S.O. 1981, c. 72, inconsistent with ss. 7,
8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the extent that it authorizes the
random stop of a motor vehicle and its driver by a police officer acting without any
reasonable grounds or other articulable cause to believe that an offence has been committed,
when such stop is not part of an organized procedure such as the R.I.D.E. program?
At p. 30 C.C.C., the court concluded that the case was “governed by the decision in Hufsky”, adding:
Section 8 might be brought into play in circumstances where the police, in the process of a
random stop, found in the car marijuana or an item of stolen property. But the police in this
case did no more than request the appellant’s licence and insurance papers. The appellant
quickly admitted that his licence was under suspension and as a result he was unable to produce
these documents. It follows that it cannot be argued that a “seizure” within the meaning of
s. 8 occurred. The action of the police in this case cannot be regarded as a violation of s. 8 of
the Charter.
10
Here, the distinction is drawn between arbitrary in the sense of “random”, “no criteria
for selection”, with “absolute discretion” without “criteria, express or implied, which govern its
exercise” (R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, 40 C.C.C. (3d) 398, at 407 (S.C.C.)) or indiscriminate,
capricious, abusive and indiscriminate (R. v. Cayer, [1988] O.J. No. 1120, 66 C.R. (3d) 30, at 43
(Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal refused [1989] 1 S.C.R. vii (S.C.C.))) on the one hand, and, on the other,
an officer’s mistaken application of a reasonable grounds or reasonable suspicion standard within
the context of a specific fact situation. It was observed in Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality)
Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 22 (Ont. C.A.) (notice of discontinuance
filed after leave to appeal granted [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 87 (S.C.C.)) that “articulable cause is used
only to distinguish between those lawful stops which are random and, therefore, arbitrary and those
lawful stops which are selective and not arbitrary”. On this view, the selectivity criterion, in effect
the absence of randomness, distinguishes arbitrary from non-arbitrary.
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the level of unlawful police conduct, as opposed to the imposition of
arbitrary detention breaching section 9.11 While a finding of unlawful
detention is not dispositive of the section 9 Charter issue, such a finding
nevertheless “will play a central role in determining whether the detention
is also arbitrary”.12
Section 8 of the Charter “guarantees a broad and general right to be
secure from unreasonable search and seizure”.13 While Hunter v. Southam14
introduced a constitutional framework for section 8 analysis extending
11

Turning again to the subject raised in footnote 10, the appropriate characterization of
imperfect application of a selective standard of belief to particular facts, in R. v. Duguay, [1989]
S.C.J. No. 4, 46 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 5 (S.C.C.), in stating that: “The majority in the Court of Appeal
for Ontario did not enunciate any principle or rule of law with which we disagree”, the Court
implicitly approved the dicta of MacKinnon A.C.J.O. ([1995] O.J. No. 2492, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at 296
(Ont. C.A.)):
It cannot be that every unlawful arrest necessarily falls within the words “arbitrarily
detained”. The grounds upon which an arrest was made may fall “just short” of constituting
reasonable and probable cause. The person making the arrest may honestly, though mistakenly,
believe that reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest exist and there may be some basis
for that belief. In those circumstances the arrest, though subsequently found to be unlawful,
could not be said to be capricious or arbitrary. On the other hand, the entire absence of
reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest could support an inference that no reasonable
person could have genuinely believed that such grounds existed. In such cases, the conclusion
would be that the person arrested was arbitrarily detained. Between these two ends of the
spectrum, shading from white to grey to black, the issue of whether an accused was arbitrarily
detained will depend, basically, on two considerations: first, the particular facts of the case,
and secondly, the view taken by the court with respect to the extent of the departure from
the standard of reasonable and probable grounds and the honesty of the belief and basis for
the belief in the existence of reasonable and probable grounds on the part of the person
making the arrest.
Subsequently, the question as to whether “[u]nlawful arrests may be inherently arbitrary” was left
as an open question in R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J. No. 11, 112 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 204 (S.C.C.).
In R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, at paras. 20-21, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.), the court
observed that a lawful search cannot be arbitrary without committing itself to saying every unlawful
search is arbitrary. That said, the distinction between unlawful detention/arrest and that which is
properly characterized as arbitrary has been otherwise solidly grounded jurisprudentially: R. v.
Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 504 (Ont. C.A.); (“it may be that a detention
although unlawful would not be arbitrary if the officer erroneously believed on reasonable grounds
that he had an articulable cause. I need not decide whether such a belief could avoid an infringement of
s. 9 of the Charter”); R. v. Ladouceur, [1987] O.J. No. 333, 35 C.C.C. (3d), 240, at 252 (Ont. C.A.)
(revd on a different basis [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, 56 C.C.C. (3d) 22 (S.C.C.)); R. v. Cayer, [1988]
O.J. No. 1120, 66 C.R. (3d) 30, at 43 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal refused [1989] 1 S.C.R. vii); R. v.
Monney, [1997] O.J. No. 4806, 120 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at paras. 88-90 (Ont. C.A.) (revd on a different
basis [1999] S.C.J. No. 18, 133 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.)); R. v. Willis, [2003] M.J. No. 117, 174 C.C.C.
(3d) 406, at para. 18 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Tam, [1995] B.C.J. No. 1428, 100 C.C.C. (3d) 196, at 210
(B.C.C.A.); Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality) Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274, 131 C.C.C.
(3d) 1, at paras. 12, 20-21 (Ont. C.A.) (notice of discontinuance filed after leave to appeal granted
[1999] S.C.C.A. No. 87 (S.C.C.)).
12
R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 488 (Ont. C.A.).
13
Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 107 (S.C.C.).
14
Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
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beyond narrow common law notions of trespass to include reasonable
expectation of privacy, the Court did not limit section 8 protection to
reasonable expectation of privacy alone.15 Five years later, the Court
specifically noted that Hunter’s construct for section 8 “underlined that
a major, though not necessarily the only, purpose of the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 is the
protection of the privacy of the individual”.16 Again, two decades later,
with the Supreme Court of Canada observing that in the purposive
approach to section 8 of the Charter, a guarantee to protect “people, not
places”, “privacy became the dominant organizing principle”,17 it is evident
that it is not the exclusive principle.
Not unlike the reasonableness element of section 8 of the Charter,
the concept of investigative detention rooted in the Waterfield18 analysis
requires that the detention be a justifiable use of police power associated
with an identified police duty. There must be “reasonable necessity or
justification”.19 Reasonable grounds to suspect the individual’s involvement
in recent or ongoing criminal activity and that detention is reasonably
necessary to confirm or dispel that suspicion is the minimum threshold
for interference with a person’s liberty or freedom of movement. 20 A
detainee may be searched, on reasonable grounds, for a weapon to protect
15
Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 108-109 (S.C.C.). At 108,
the Court linked the s. 8 Charter right to “the public’s interest in being left alone”. This includes
freedom of movement as “[a]bsent a law to the contrary, individuals are free to do as they please”:
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 15 (S.C.C.).
16
R. v. Dyment, [1989] S.C.J. No. 82, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244, at 253 (S.C.C.).
17
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 129, at 138-39 (S.C.C.). Section 8
is also “equally intended to protect people not things”: R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, 45
C.C.C. (3d) 244, at 259 (S.C.C.).
18
R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, [1964] 1 Q.B. 164 (C.A.).
19
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at 320-21, 324 (S.C.C.) (“The
overall reasonableness of the decision to detain, however, must further be assessed against all of the
circumstances, most notably the extent to which the interference with individual liberty is necessary
to perform the officer’s duty, the liberty interfered with, and the nature and extent of that interference,
in order to meet the second prong of the Waterfield test.”) As well, the importance of the duty
discharged by the officer to the public good must be considered: R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45,
20 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 121-22 (S.C.C.). Using search and seizure as the conceptual framework for an
investigative stop or detention recognizing that reasonableness in its common sense and constitutional
dimensions “is a spacious concept” (A.R. Amar, “Terry and the Future: Terry and Fourth
Amendment First Principles” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1097, at 1118), it allows for invocation
of this proportionality principle as noted by C. Slobogin, “Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call For
Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1053, at 1053, “a search
or seizure is reasonable if the strength of its justification is roughly proportionate to the level of
intrusion associated with the police action.”
20
Discussed infra at pp. 151-62.
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the detaining police officer. 21 Questions during the detention may,
depending on the circumstances, amount to a search for and seizure of
information.22
The result is pieces of search and seizure analysis grafted onto an
exclusive section 9 Charter analysis relating to the detention itself — a
stop and restraint of the person subjected to investigative detention whether
by physical or psychological compulsion to surrender liberty and freedom
of movement.
We have experience with the seizure of persons by warrants of arrest,
Feeney23 warrants, or section 487.01(1) Criminal Code24 general warrants.
Such measures involve governmental interference with physical and
personal autonomy. Charter rights are to be interpreted generously, not
in a narrow or legalistic fashion.25 If questioning can constitute a search,
and observations by the police a seizure, then it is no stretch to consider
the stop and restraint of movement of an individual as a warrantless
seizure. Although, as said, reasonable expectation of privacy is not a
sine qua non for section 8 Charter protection, the circumstances of
an investigative detention may implicate intrusion upon a reasonable
expectation of privacy as the police are able to take advantage of the
opportunity to undertake precise scrutiny of a pedestrian’s person,
clothes and carried possessions, or the interior of a stopped vehicle, or to
question a detainee who, often perceiving compulsion to respond, answers
questions in a context which would not meet the section 8 criteria for a
valid and informed consent search.
Before rushing to subsume unlawful detention (i.e., subjectively and
in good faith, an officer believes she has reasonable suspicion to detain
but is mistaken, falling just short on the objective aspect of the test) into
section 9 arbitrariness, a standard of constitutional departure including
elevated police misconduct such as randomness, capriciousness, improper
purpose, and the like, we should pause and take a last opportunity,
assuming it still exists, to assess the issue in section 8 Charter terms.
The decision to opt for a paradigm focusing on the arbitrariness of the
stop and restraint, as opposed to the reasonableness of the seizure of
the individual, holds significant implications, not the least of which is
21
22
23
24
25

Discussed infra at pp. 163-68.
Discussed infra at pp. 168-75.
R. v. Feeney, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, 115 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.).
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244, at 253 (S.C.C.).
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that the onus resides with the accused to demonstrate in the section 9
context that she or he was arbitrarily detained, whereas consideration of
investigative detention as a warrantless seizure/search would flip the burden
to the Crown to establish compliance with section 8 Charter principles.26
In any event, whether or not described as pure section 8 Charter issues,
a number of search/seizure-like issues arising in investigative detention
cases warrant further discussion.

II. REASONABLE GROUNDS TO SUSPECT…
Given that the exercise of police powers in furtherance of public
safety is not unrestrained in the sense of being entirely at the whim of
state agents regardless of the circumstances, government interference
with an individual’s liberty must be premised on a standard of belief. A
standard is effectively a judicially established cost/benefit policy governing
the generic factual scenario, including consideration of the nature and
degree of interference with civil rights and the public interest objective of
the restraint.
Standards of belief — requisite degrees of probability — have
generally been accepted by the courts as incapable of precise definition
and more often than not are described in terms of what they are not.
Justice La Forest observed as to reasonable and probable grounds:
Let me first say something about the vagueness of the proposed
test of “reasonable and probable cause” and the consequential danger
of giving the police power to enter into a private dwelling on that
basis. The expression, no doubt, comprises something more than mere
surmise, but determining with any useful measure of precision what it
means beyond that poses rather intractable problems both for the police
and the courts. . . . I have found nothing in the cases or in learned
commentaries that gives much assistance in giving more precision to
the concept, the situations being so various. Because of the vagueness
of the discretion it gives a police officer, that discretion is virtually
uncontrollable.27

26

Such a s. 8 Charter approach would likely impact on racial profiling litigation as, in the
s. 9 context, “[p]lacing an onus on the accused to prove the unstated subjective motivations of a
police officer explains why few, if any, racial profiling cases have been challenged and exposed in court”:
D.M. Tanovich, “Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an Equality-Based
Conception of Arbitrary Detention” (2004) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 145, at para. 75.
27
R. v. Landry, [1986] S.C.J. No. 10, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 25-26 (S.C.C.) (dissenting in the
result).
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On the other hand, L’Heureux-Dubé J. viewed the standard as a
practical, non-technical threshold which, “at its core . . . is a ‘common
sense’ concept”.28
“Reasonableness” comprehends a requirement of probability. 29
Reasonable grounds to believe have been equated to the American Fourth
Amendment standard of “probable cause”. 30 The standard “to be met
in order to establish reasonable grounds for a search is ‘reasonable
probability’”.31 Put somewhat differently, reasonable grounds to believe,
the point where the state’s interest in detecting crime begins to prevail
over the individual’s interest in being left alone, is “where crediblybased probability replaces suspicion”.32 The standard of reasonable grounds
to believe “is not to be equated with proof beyond a reasonable doubt or
a prima facie case. . . . The standard to be met is one of reasonable
probability”.33
The Hunter v. Southam34 standard of reasonable grounds is accepted
as “the minimum standard” for constitutional compliance where the
state’s interest is “law enforcement”.35 As such, belief that evidence may
be uncovered in a search, as a general rule, impermissibly dilutes that
standard to the mere “possibility of finding evidence”.36
Consensus exists that conjecture or a hunch cannot generally support
the legitimate exercise of a police power interfering with individual liberty.

28

R. v. Feeney, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, 115 C.C.C. (3d) 129, at para. 124 (S.C.C.) (dissenting
in the result) (“There are no absolute magic words necessary to define when this standard has been
reached”).
29
Baron v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 6, 78 C.C.C. (3d) 510, at 532 (S.C.C.).
30
Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 114 (S.C.C.).
31
Baron v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 6, 78 C.C.C. (3d) 510, at 532 (S.C.C.). This is not a
standard of “certainty”: R. v. Mouland, [2007] S.J. No. 532, 2007 SKCA 105, at para. 22 (Sask. C.A.).
32
Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 114-15 (S.C.C.).
33
R. v. Debot, [1986] O.J. No. 994, 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207, at 219 (Ont. C.A.) (affd [1989]
S.C.J. No. 118, 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 198, 213 (S.C.C.)). C. Slobogin, “Let’s Not Bury Terry: A
Call For Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1053, at 1082,
assuming the probable cause standard equates to a minimum “more likely than not” threshold, states:
“But can we be serious about that definition? Are we really willing to allow police to arrest
someone when there is a 50% chance they have the wrong person?”
34
Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
35
Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 115 (S.C.C.).
36
Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 114 (S.C.C.). Baron v.
Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 6, 78 C.C.C. (3d) 510, at 532-33 (S.C.C.): “This court established in
Hunter that a standard of credibly based probability rather than mere suspicion should be applied in
determining when an individual’s interest in privacy is subordinate to the needs of law enforcement
. . . the controlling standard is credibly-based probability, not mere possibility.”
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“A ‘hunch’ based entirely on intuition gained by experience cannot
suffice, no matter how accurate that ‘hunch’ might prove to be.”37
The relevant factual baseline for an investigative detention is that
available at the time of detention, a “front-end” determination and not
“[l]ater acquired information”.38
The defined standard for a police officer to effect an investigative
detention is “reasonable grounds to suspect” that in all the circumstances
a person “is connected to a particular crime and that such a detention is
necessary”.39 This equates to the “articulable cause” standard of American
search and seizure jurisprudence. 40 The accepted standard then is
“reasonable suspicion” — a state of belief grounded in objectively
discernible facts41 and “clearly a threshold somewhat lower than the
reasonable and probable grounds required for lawful arrest”, 42 a less
demanding standard, though more than “unparticularized suspicion or
‘hunch’”.43 The precise contours of the standard, imported from the U.S.

37

R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 501 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Mann,
[2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 30 (S.C.C.).
38
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 34 (S.C.C.); R. v. Cooper,
[2005] N.S.J. No. 102, 195 C.C.C. (3d) 162, at paras. 29, 42 (N.S.C.A.); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S.
266, at 271 (2000); A.S. Patel, “Detention and Articulable Cause: Arbitrariness and Growing
Judicial Deference to Police Judgment” (2001) 45 Crim. L.Q. 198, at 202 (danger in some cases of
“police shap[ing] their testimony after an ex post facto consideration of the incident”).
39
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 45 (S.C.C.).
40
R. v. Jacques, [1996] S.C.J. No. 88, 110 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at para. 24 (S.C.C.) per Major J.
in dissent on a different point; R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 503 (Ont. C.A.).
41
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at 324-25 (S.C.C.).
42
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at 322 (S.C.C.); R. v. Simpson,
[1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.), at 501 (“particularized suspicion”), 502
(“reasonable suspicion of crime”); a standard lower than the standard set by s. 495(1) of the Code
for an arrest: R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at paras. 27, 45 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Cooper, [2005] N.S.J. No. 102, 195 C.C.C. (3d) 162, at 172 (N.S.C.A.); R. v. Greaves, [2004]
B.C.J. No. 1953, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 305, at para. 41 (B.C.C.A.) (leave to appeal refused [2004] S.C.C.A.
No. 522 (S.C.C.)); C. Slobogin, “Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call For Rejuvenation of the Proportionality
Principle” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1053, at 1082, citing C.M.A. McCauliff, “Burdens of Proof:
Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?” (1982), 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1293,
at 1327-28 that a surveyed group of American federal judges considered the “reasonable suspicion”
standard to carry about a 30 per cent level of certainty, questions whether we should be “willing to
subject two innocent people” to restraint of liberty “to nab one bad actor”.
43
U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, at 7 (1989); R. v. Calderon, [2004] O.J. No. 3474, 188 C.C.C.
(3d) 481, at 491 (Ont. C.A.), per Weiler J.A. otherwise in dissent; R. v. Byfield, [2005] O.J. No. 228,
193 C.C.C. (3d) 139, at 147 (Ont. C.A.) (not “hunches, speculation and guesses”). See also R. v. Simpson,
[1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 501 (Ont. C.A.): “Terms like ‘articulable reasons’ and
‘founded suspicion’ are not self-defining; they fall short of providing clear guidance dispositive of
the myriad factual situations that arise.”
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Terry44 stop and frisk experience, is not made clearer by resort to the
American cases.45
What is apparent is that the standard of reasonable grounds to suspect
is the “possibility” threshold subjected to criticism in Hunter v. Southam46
and Baron v. Canada47 during the establishment of the reasonable and
probable grounds standard as the minimum constitutional standard for
search and seizure in furtherance of law enforcement interests. The
reasonable grounds to suspect standard is a minimal level of belief
which does not rule out “the possibility of innocent conduct”48 or “other
reasonable possibilities”.49 Indeed, it has been observed “that a reasonable
suspicion will much more frequently be wrong than will reasonable and
probable grounds”.50
Critics of investigative detention imposable on a reasonable suspicion
threshold argue that such a malleable and ambiguous standard is a
prescription for pretextual stops in high crime areas, detention based on
lack of cooperation, or stops employing race and stereotyping as proxies
for criminality. The risks to liberty of adoption of a significantly depressed
standard of belief are not necessarily offset by the judicial interpretive
toolkit accompanying the “reasonable grounds to suspect” threshold, which
kit includes the following:
(1) The totality of the circumstances, the content and reliability of the
information acquired by the officer, must be assessed in determining
44

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, at 417 (1981) (reasonable suspicion is not a “finely-tuned
standard”); U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, at 274 (2002) (“concept of reasonable suspicion is
somewhat abstract”; “we have deliberately avoided reducing it to ‘a neat set of legal rules’”); U.S.
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, at 7 (1989) (articulable cause amounts to a level of suspicion “fall[ing]
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of evidence standard”).
46
Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
47
[1993] S.C.J. No. 6, 78 C.C.C. (3d) 510 (S.C.C.).
48
U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, at 277 (2002).
49
U.S. v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, at 593 (5th Cir. 2004).
50
T. Quigley, “Brief Investigative Detentions: A Critique of R. v. Simpson” (2004) 41
Alta. L. Rev. 935, at para. 20. In R. v. Lal, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2446, 130 C.C.C. (3d) 413, at 423
(B.C.C.A.) (leave to appeal refused [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 28 (S.C.C.)), the Court observed that,
“Since the standard for reasonable suspicion is less demanding than that for reasonable belief it can
arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show reasonable belief.” Similarly,
in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, at 330 (1990), the Court observed that
[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense
that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or
content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable
suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable
cause.
45
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whether reasonable suspicion exists — a constellation of objectively
discernible facts together with rational inferences from those facts
— with a preference for scrutiny of the whole picture; each fact or
indicator ought not to be separated out for isolated assessment where
the police are involved in fluid and fast-paced law enforcement,
making quick decisions on limited information.51
(2) Avoidance of second-guessing the police and the perspective of
hindsight contribute to immunizing the exercise of discretion from
critical review.52
51
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at paras. 34, 45 (S.C.C.) (“the
totality of the circumstances. . . informing the officer’s suspicion”; “in all the circumstances”); R. v.
Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308; 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 501 (S.C.C.) (assessment based “upon all of
the circumstances”); R. v. Lal, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2446, 130 C.C.C. (3d) 413, at 423 (B.C.C.A.)
(leave to appeal refused [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 28 (S.C.C.)) (“Reasonable suspicion like reasonable
belief is dependent on both the content of the information provided to the police and its degree of
reliability”); U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, at 273-74, 277 (2002) (reasonable suspicion determination
to be made on “totality of the circumstances” approach; “divide-and-conquer analysis” of separating
out individual factors inappropriate even though “each of these factors alone is susceptible to
innocent explanation . . . ”); R. v. Calderon, [2004] O.J. No. 3474, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at paras.
15, 18 (Ont. C.A.) per Weiler J.A. (in dissent in the result) (potentially “neutral indicators”, though
each “susceptible of innocent explanation”, the “totality of circumstances” may “be suspicious”);
R. v. Tran, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2341, 2007 BCCA 491, at paras. 15, 17 (B.C.C.A.) (factors to be
considered “cumulatively” not looking at each item of evidence viewed “separately”); R. v. Schrenk,
[2007] M.J. No. 154, 2007 MBQB 93, at para. 51 (Man. Q.B.) (“sometimes facts which on their own
have little or no significance, when combined with other events or facts, create a situation from
which reasonable inferences may be drawn. It is equally so, however, that ‘zero plus zero equals zero’,
so a long list of only potentially suspicious facts does not create reasonable grounds to suspect an
individual was connected to a crime”); R. v. Gurr, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1480, 2007 BCSC 979,
at para. 23 (B.C.S.C.) (accused argued “there could have been an innocent explanation for all of
these things”; held: “That . . . is not the test”); R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d)
449, at para. 53 (S.C.C.) per Abella J. (“responding to legitimate safety concerns in a ‘fast-paced’
situation”) and at paras. 97, 99, 122 per Binnie J. (“The law requires individual police officers to
make difficult decisions under fast-moving conditions”; “The tip was hot. Quick police action promised
success”; “The police do not always have the advantage of the full story from a 911 caller”); R. v. Mann,
[2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at 318 (S.C.C.) (“[P]olice officers must be empowered
to respond quickly, effectively, and flexibly to the diversity of encounters daily on the front lines of
policing”).
52
R. v. Landry, [1986] S.C.J. No. 10, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 26-27 (S.C.C.), per La Forest J.
in dissent in the result (“The police’s job of maintaining the peace and enforcing the criminal law is
difficult enough without fearing being regularly ‘second-guessed’ about every mistake of judgment
in such circumstances”); Crampton v. Walton, [2005] A.J. No. 178, 194 C.C.C. (3d) 207, at 221
(Alta. C.A.) (immediate decision of a police officer made in the course of duty not generally
assessed through “the lens of hindsight”); R. v. White, [2007] O.J. No. 1605, 2007 ONCA 318,
at para. 54 (Ont. C.A.) (“. . . he found himself in a dangerous and potentially volatile situation. In
the circumstances, he had little time to reflect. He had to make a split second decision; a moment’s
hesitation could have put his life and that of his partner in peril. Courts should keep this in mind
when assessing the conduct of officers in the field. When it comes to officer safety and preserving
the integrity of their investigation, police officers should be given a good deal of leeway and second
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(3) Although the standard has both the subjective suspicion of the police
officer and, as a control or check, an objective component of
reasonable suspicion of one placed in the circumstances of the
officer,53 the subjective and objective aspects of the threshold belief
include consideration of the training and experience of the detaining
officer.54
guessing should be avoided”); Webster v. Edmonton (City) Police Service, [2007] A.J. No. 71, 2007
ABCA 23, at paras. 28-29 (Alta. C.A.) (court’s “inappropriate use of hindsight”); R. v. Aguirre,
[2006] O.J. No. 5071, at para. 259 (Ont. S.C.J.) (“Although the police ‘usually act deliberately and
not accidentally’ (R. v. Brown, at para. 63), ‘[a] certain amount of latitude is permitted to police
officers who are under a duty to act and must often react in difficult and exigent circumstances’: R.
v. Asante-Mensah (Ont. C.A.) [[2001] O.J. No. 3819, 157 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.)], at p. 510
[affd [2003] S.C.J. No. 38, 174 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.)]. Unlike search warrant applications, in an
arrest situation, ‘the dynamics at play . . . are very different’ as the police must make an arrest
decision ‘based on available information which is often less than exact or complete’: R. v. Polashek
(1999), 134 C.C.C. (3d) 187 (Ont. C.A.) at pp. 197-8. In street policing, police officers do not have
the ‘luxury of waiting and synthesizing all information available to them’ (R. v. Mollazadeh,
[[2006] B.C.J. No. 181, 2006 BCCA 35 (B.C.C.A.)] at paras. 9-10) as ‘on the spot’ decisions are
made without ‘time for careful reflection’: R. v. Golub [[1997] O.J. No. 3097, 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193
(Ont. C.A.)], at p. 211 [leave to appeal refused, [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 571, [1998] 1 S.C.R. ix (S.C.C.)]”);
U.S. v. Winston, 444 F.3d 115, at 119-21 (1st Cir. 2006) (“. . . the experienced perceptions of law
enforcement agents deserve deference and constitute a factor in our reasonable suspicion analysis”;
“. . . we are not here to second guess the agents . . .”).
53
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at paras. 27, 34 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Calderon, [2004] O.J. No. 3474, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at 504 (Ont. C.A.) (“The objectivity of the
assessment is critical”).
54
R. v. Feeney, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, 115 C.C.C. (3d) 129, at 149 (S.C.C.) per Sopinka J.
(“The objective test . . . is whether a reasonable person, standing in the shoes of the officer, would
have believed . . .”) and per L’Heureux-Dubé J. dissenting in the result at 183 (“should incorporate
the experience of the officer”); U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, at 418 (1981) (“the evidence . . . must
be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed
in the field of law enforcement”); U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, at 273-74, 277 (2002) (allows
officers to draw on their own experience and training to make inferences from and deductions about
the cumulative information available to them that “might well elude an untrained person”; due
weight to be given to factual inferences drawn by local law enforcement officers); Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, at 372 (1993) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, at 30 (1968), “where a
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot…”); R. v. Juan, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1402, 222 C.C.C.
(3d) 289, at para. 19 (B.C.C.A.) (“the ‘reasonable person’ is presumed to have the knowledge and
experience . . . of a knowledgeable and experienced police officer”); R. v. Tran, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2341,
2007 BCCA 491, at para. 12 (B.C.C.A.) (experience of police officers relevant and relates to
existence of objective grounds); R. v. Mouland, [2007] S.J. No. 532, at paras. 26-27 (Sask. C.A.)
(officers entitled to act on their “training and experience”); R. v. Ingle, [2007] B.C.J. No. 2024,
2007 BCCA 445, at para. 53 (B.C.C.A.) (“based on his extensive experience in investigati ng
marihuana cases”); R. v. Iraheta, [2007] O.J. No. 2205, at paras. 16, 23 (Ont. S.C.J.) (officer relying on
past “experience, knowledge and training”); R. v. Quillian, [1991] A.J. No. 1211, 122 A.R. 131, at
para. 56 (Alta. Q.B.) (“I am of the opinion that the reasonable person must be deemed to have the
same level of experience as the police officer whose actions are being scrutinized. If this were not so,
then the reasonable man would have no standard or guideline against which to measure the
reasonableness of the officer’s belief.”); R. v. Grotheim, [2001] S.J. No. 694, 2001 SKCA 116,
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(4) There is no sound reason for invalidating an otherwise proper stop
because the police used the opportunity afforded by that stop to
further some other legitimate interest.55
These interpretive guidelines do not relieve the court of its obligation
to ascertain whether, objectively viewed, there existed articulable and
logically probative factors meeting the requisite standard of belief.
Deference to law enforcement has its boundaries.56 An officer’s experience
and assessment of an ongoing situation “must not become a substitute
for a court’s independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the officer’s
decision and should not serve as a basis for rubber stamping the
officer’s conclusion”.57
Many have voiced concern that despite the existence of an objective
component,58 the judicial creation of a police power to detain for
investigative purposes on a low-level standard of belief holds implications
for racial profiling or at least a disproportionate impact on visible
minorities.59 On occasion, the issue of race is inextricably bound up in a
at para. 30 (Sask. C.A.) (“Whether such grounds in fact exist depends upon whether a reasonable
person, standing in the shoes of the police officer, would have believed that there were reasonable
and probable grounds for making an arrest”); R. v. Rajaratnam, [2006] A.J. No. 1373, 214 C.C.C.
(3d) 547, at 559 (Alta. C.A.) (“a judge is entitled to consider a police officer’s training and
experience in determining objective reasonableness . . . What may appear to be innocent objects to
the general public may have a very different meaning to an officer experienced in drug operations”);
R. v. Lawes, [2007] O.J. No. 50, 2007 ONCA 10, at para. 4 (Ont. C.A.) (“An objective assessment
will include the dynamics within which the police officer acted, and his or her experience”); R. v.
Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 501 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Calderon, [2004] O.J.
No. 3474, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at para. 19 (Ont. C.A.) (dissent) (constable could take into account
training received on drug interdiction courses).
55
Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality) Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274, 131 C.C.C.
(3d) 1, at 17 (Ont. C.A.) (notice of discontinuance filed after leave to appeal granted [1999]
S.C.C.A. No. 87 (S.C.C.)).
56
A.S. Patel, “Detention and Articulable Cause: Arbitrariness and Growing Judicial Deference
to Police Judgment” (2001) 45 Crim. L.Q. 198, at 202; T. Maclin, “Terry and Race: Terry v. Ohio’s
Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1271,
at 1309 (“When a police suspicion test is substituted for the probable cause standard, the judicial
tendency to defer to police intuition and experience is exacerbated”).
57
L.R. Katz, “Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View” (2004) 74 Miss. L.J. 423,
at 491.
58
R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482, at 501-502 (Ont. C.A.) (objective
standard “serves to avoid indiscriminate and discriminatory exercises of the police power” or a
purely subjective assessment that “can too easily mask discriminatory conduct based on such
irrelevant factors as the detainee’s . . . colour . . . ethnic origin”).
59
J. Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention
After Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299, at 304 (“the reality that abuses of this new power will have
a disproportionate impact on visible minorities went unmentioned” in Mann in its approval of
investigative detentions which are “low-visibility encounters”) and 313-14 (footnotes omitted)
(“. . . a mounting body of empirical evidence would now seem to suggest, when these powers are
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abused, the effect is felt disproportionately by visible minorities, in particular African and Aboriginal
Canadians”); R. v. Landry, [1986] S.C.J. No. 10, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 30 (S.C.C.) per La Forest J.
dissenting (grant of a vague discretion to police most likely to be used “against the disadvantaged”
including “on the poor and on marginal, minority groups”); A. Fiszauf, “Articulating Cause —
Investigative Detention and Its Implications” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 327, at 335 (“In recent years,
the police practice of profiling has become increasingly prevalent and linked to investigative
detentions”); D. Tanovich, “E-Racing Racial Profiling” (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 905; B.L. Berger,
“Race and Erasure in R. v. Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 58; D.M. Tanovich, “The Colourless World
of Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 47; D.A. Harris, “Terry and the Fourth Amendment: Particularized
Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under
Terry v. Ohio” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 975; F.R. Cooper, “Cultural Context Matters: Terry’s
‘Seasaw Effect’” (2003) 56 Okla. L. Rev. 833; T.R. Calderon, “Race-Based Policing from Terry to
Wardlow: Steps Down the Totalitarian Path” (2000) 44 How. L.J. 73; M. Carpiniello, “Striking A
Sincere Balance: A Reasonable Black Person Standard For ‘Location Plus Evasion’ Terry Stops”
(2001) 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 355; R. v. Young, [2007] O.J. No. 102, 84 O.R. (3d) 437 (Ont. C.J.) (in
context of investigation detention analysis, the Court noting at 441, “the seemingly endless
confrontations between police officers and (usually) poor young males in this city [Toronto] . . .”
(further footnoting that the defendant was an Afro-Canadian). In dissent in Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119 (2000), a stop and frisk case, Stevens J., writing for himself and three others, stated at
129, 132-33:
In short, there are unquestionably circumstances in which a person’s flight is suspicious,
and undeniably instances in which a person runs for entirely innocent reasons. 3
.....
3
Compare, e.g. Proverbs 28:1 (“The wicked flee when no man pursueth: but the
righteous are as bold as a lion” with Proverbs 22:3 (“A shrewd man sees trouble coming
and lies low; the simple walk into it and pay the penalty”).
I have rejected reliance on the former proverb in the past, because its “ivory
towered analysis of the real world” fails to account for the experiences of many citizens
of this country, particularly those who are minorities. See California v. Hodari D., 499
U.S. 621, 630, n. 4, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690, 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991) Stevens J., dissenting).
That this pithy expression fails to capture the total reality of our world, however, does
not mean it is inaccurate in all instances.
.....

Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing in high crime areas,
there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without
justification, believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any
criminal activity associated with the officer’s sudden presence. For such a person, unprovoked
flight is neither “aberrant” nor “abnormal.”8 Moreover, these concerns and fears are known
to the police officers themselves, and are validated by law enforcement investigations into
their own practices. Accordingly, the evidence supporting the reasonableness of these beliefs is
too pervasive to be dismissed as random or rare, and too persuasive to be disparaged as
inconclusive or insufficient. [footnotes omitted except footnote 8]
.....
8
Many stops never lead to an arrest, which further exacerbates the perceptions of
discrimination felt by racial minorities and people living in high crime areas. See
Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. Times Magazine, June 20, 1999, p. 85
(reporting that in 2-year period, New York City Police Department Street Crimes Unit
made 45,000 stops, only 9,500, or 20%, of which resulted in arrest); Casimir, supra, n. 7
(reporting that in 1997, New York City’s Street Crimes Unit conducted 27,061 stopand-frisks, only 4,647 of which, 17%, resulted in arrest). Even if these data were race
neutral, they would still indicate that society as a whole is paying a significant cost in
infringement on liberty by these virtually random stops.
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report to the police of criminal conduct and as such forms a necessarily
integral feature of identifying the person alleged to have been involved,
or to be involved, in criminal activity.60 On other occasions, the role of
race in effecting an investigative detention is more questionable.61
Where the authorities receive a report of sufficient reliability 62
60
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at paras. 44, 46, 47 (S.C.C.)
per Abella J. (police told suspects were black males and occupants of stopped vehicle “matched the
race of the suspects mentioned in the 911 call”; they “matched the general description they had”;
“the police would not have had reasonable grounds for the continued detention of non -white
occupants”) and at paras. 81, 122, 124 per Binnie J. (after the stop of the vehicle, “the only relevant
description of the individuals from the 911 call was that they were all black”; “the 911 caller must
be presumed to be less error prone in dealing with a person’s appearance” than in dealing with
vehicle recognition; “if the occupants of the stopped car had been female and Asiatic” then a
tailored roadblock would let them pass; “Farmer, being black, fit the general description given by
the 911 caller”); R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at 315 (S.C.C.) (police
looking for a suspect whose description included that he was an Aboriginal Canadian); R. v.
Aguirre, [2006] O.J. No. 5071, at paras. 60, 180 (Ont. S.C.J.) (police seeking suspect whose
description included that he was of olive complexion and Spanish appearance).
61
R. v. Aslam, [2006] B.C.J. No. 3152, 2006 BCCA 551, at para. 2 (B.C.C.A.) (in routine
licence plate check, officers determined vehicle “registered to a person with an Asian name” and,
because the driver “appeared to be East Indian”, the police stopped the van to see if it was stolen).
62
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at para. 34 (S.C.C.) (police
“should be entitled to rely” on information from a 911 call); and para. 122 (police do not always
have “the full story from a 911 caller”); R. v. Plummer, [2007] O.J. No. 2818, at paras. 43-48, 55-56,
148-52 (Ont. S.C.J.) (“Officer Safety Alert” used by officer as part of grounds to detain re weapon
investigation though unaware of reliability of information behind Alert); R. v. Lewis, [1998] O.J.
No. 376, 122 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at 489, 493 (Ont. C.A.) (re anonymous tipster’s information, the
“totality of the circumstances” must be considered — “The totality of circumstances encompasses
factors which are relevant either to the accuracy of the specific information supplied by the tipster
or the reliability of the tipster as a source of information for the police”; here, although Lewis was
scheduled to fly to Edmonton on a Canada 3000 flight at the time indicated and he matched the
description given by the caller (“a clean shaven, heavy-set black man named Keith Lewis” [at 485])
and was travelling with a young child as reported, the absence of confirmation of details other than
which describe innocent and commonplace conduct held to be insufficient to constitute reasonable
grounds for an arrest or search but amounting to “articulable cause to briefly detain [Lewis] to
investigate the allegations made by the tipster” [at 493]); but see Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,
at 272-73 (anonymous tip to police that young black male at a particular bus stop wearing a plaid
shirt was carrying a gun; on arrival at the bus stop, three black males observed with one wearing a
plaid shirt; frisk of suspect revealed gun in his pocket; held: no reasonable suspicion to justify stop
and frisk; held [at 271-73]:
The anonymous call concerning J.L. provided no predictive information and therefore left
the police without means to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility. That the allegation
about the gun turned out to be correct does not suggest that the officers, prior to the frisks,
had a reasonable basis for suspecting J.L. of engaging in unlawful conduct . . .
.....

Such a tip, however, does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal
activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion
of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. Cf. 4 W. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 9.4(h), p. 213 (3d ed. 1996) (distinguishing reliability as to identification,
which is often important in other criminal law contexts, from reliability as to the likelihood
of criminal activity, which is central in anonymous-tip cases).
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describing a person who is, or has recently been, involved in criminal
activity, the police search for someone resembling the broadcast description.
The case law, consistent with the minimal degree of probability for
investigative detention, as currently contoured, does not require extensive
details63 or an identical match64 before lawful detention can be effected.
Where the police do not operate from a reported description but happen
upon an individual they suspect of involvement in criminality, the
indicators or circumstantial factors subjectively employed to support that

A second major argument advanced by Florida and the United States as amicus is, in
essence, that the standard Terry analysis should be modified to license a “firearm exception.”
Under such an exception, a tip alleging an illegal gun would justify a stop and frisk even if
the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing. We decline to adopt this position.
Firearms are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual precautions.
Our decisions recognize the serious threat that armed criminals pose to public safety; Terry’s
rule, which permits protective police searches on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather
than demanding that officers meet the higher standard of probable cause, responds to this
very concern. See 392 U.S. at 30. But an automatic firearm exception to our established reliability
analysis would rove too far. Such an exception would enable any person seeking to harass
another to set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person
simply by placing an anonymous call falsely reporting the target’s unlawful carriage of a
gun. Nor could one securely confine such an exception to allegations involving firearms.
Several Courts of Appeals have held it per se foreseeable for people carrying significant
amounts of illegal drugs to be carrying guns as well. See, e.g., United States v. Sakyi, 160
F. ed 164, 169 (CA4 1998); United States v. Dean, 59 F.3d 1479, 1490, n. 20 (CA5 1995);
United States v. Odom, 13 F.3d 949, 959 (CA6 1994); United States v. Martinez, 958 F.2d
217, 219 (CA8 1992). If police officers may properly conduct Terry frisks on the basis of
bare-boned tips about guns, it would be reasonable to maintain under the above-cited
decisions that the police should similarly have discretion to frisk based on bare-boned tips
about narcotics. As we clarified when we made indicia of reliability critical in Adams and
White, the Fourth Amendment is not so easily satisfied.
63
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.) (black males); R. v.
Batzer, [2005] O.J. No. 3929, 200 C.C.C. (3d) 330 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 18, 19 (suspects “answered
the very general description given by the caller”).
64
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at para. 37 (S.C.C.) (persons
detained need not match “exactly” the information provided); R. v. Aguirre, [2006] O.J. No. 5071,
at para. 174 (Ont. S.C.J.) (“A suspect’s appearance need not, of course, be a perfect match before
the police act: R. v. Mollazadeh, [2006] B.C.J. No. 181 (C.A.) at paras. 9-10; R. v. Greaves (2004),
189 C.C.C. (3d) 365 (B.C.C.A.) at pp. 323-4 (leave to appeal refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 522); R. v.
Hall [[1995] O.J. No. 544, 22 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.)] at para. 39; R. v. Singh (1983), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 38
(Ont. C.A.) at p. 43”); R. v. Gurr, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1480, 2007 BCSC 979, at para. 22 (B.C.S.C.)
(person “closely resembling” the accused). This is, in part, a reflection of a reality that “reasonable
suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that
required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from
information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause”: Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325, at 330 (1990).
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belief are not always cogently and objectively probative65 except in
combination with other known facts.
The broad authority of peace officers to randomly stop vehicles on
roadways to determine driver and vehicle compliance with relevant
regulatory requirements66 cannot be used as a pretext to stop vehicles
and their occupants to further an ongoing criminal investigation through
questioning of an occupant or observations of the vehicle interior.67 The
stop must be a legitimate highway traffic legislation stop or, at the outset,
meet the criteria set for a Mann68 investigative detention.
Everyone in a motor vehicle is not by virtue of occupancy in personal,
joint or constructive possession69 of the auto or its contents. Much the same
may be said about two or more pedestrians walking together in terms of
an item, a knapsack or something in one person’s hand or pocket. The
enforcement approach frequently tends toward detention of the collective
as the police seek identification from everyone in their effort to sort
out who might be involved in illegal activity. The circumstances may
reasonably warrant such suspicion and detention,70 but the justification is
65
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.) (Clayton stared straight
ahead, made no eye contact, looked nervous and swayed from side to side); Minnesota v. Dickerson,
508 U.S. 366 (1993) (suspect made eye contact, abruptly halted, and walked in opposite direction);
R. v. Calderon, [2004] O.J. No. 3474, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at paras. 72, 74 (Ont. C.A.) (fast food,
duffel bags, roadmap, cell phones, pagers in car not amounting to reliable indicators identifying a
drug courier profile: “Given the neutrality and apparent unreliability of these indicators” they could
not amount to reasonable grounds for detention); R. v. Mouland, [2007] S.J. No. 532, at paras. 25, 27
(Sask. C.A.) (officer may consider that vehicle originated out-of-province and “unusual circumstance”
that driver not the registered owner); R. v. Cox, [1999], 132 C.C.C. (3d) 256, at para. 12 (N.B.C.A.)
(“The elements of the smuggler’s profile here are no more than hunches, speculation and guesses
that do not qualify as ‘objectively discernible facts”); U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (driver’s
posture was stiff and rigid and he did not look at the cruiser as he drove by or offer a “friendly
wave” and, as the officer followed the vehicle, the three children in the back waved in an abnormal
pattern as though instructed to do so); R. v. Rajaratnam, [2006] A.J. No. 1373, 214 C.C.C. (3d) 547
(Alta. C.A.) (suspect biting his lip, bus ticket purchased at the last minute with cash, visibly
trembling and stammering speech).
66
R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, 56 C.C.C. (3d) 22, at 37-45 (S.C.C.).
67
R. v. Doell, [2007] S.J. No. 264, 221 C.C.C. (3d) 336, at paras. 20-25, 28 (Sask. C.A.);
R. v. Houben, [2006] S.J. No. 715, 214 C.C.C. (3d) 519, at 541 (Sask. C.A.).
68
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.).
69
R. v. Terrence, [1983] S.C.J. No. 28, 4 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 198 (S.C.C.) (not merely
knowledge of the unlawful character of an object but some measure of control necessary on the part
of a passenger to establish constructive possession as defined in s. 3(b) of the Code).
70
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.) (passenger met
general description of suspects); R. v. Juan, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1402, 222 C.C.C. (3d) 289, at paras.
22-28 (B.C.C.A.) (passengers detained following police take-down of a significant cocaine
transaction; police evidence accepted that ordinarily in high-level commercial drug transactions,
principals do not take “innocents” along but rather persons as holders, protection and lookouts who
are therefore prima facie complicit in the criminality).
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not always comfortably apparent when objectively viewed.71 On occasion,
the question of the constitutionality of a passenger’s detention engages
discussion of a security detention incidental to a stop and detention of
the driver and vehicle.72

III. INCIDENTAL AUTHORITY TO SEARCH DETAINEE
Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.73 On the occasion
of an investigative detention, a police officer may execute a limited
search of the detainee. This may be essential for police safety in a close
encounter with an individual suspected of involvement in crime.74 The
71
A. Fiszauf, “Articulating Cause – Investigative Detention and Its Implications” (2007)
52 Crim. L.Q. 327, at 341 (“Routinely officers demand identification from passengers . . . without
cause”); R. v. Chaisson, [2006] S.C.J. No. 11, 206 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) (revg [2005] N.J. No. 277,
200 C.C.C. (3d) 494 (N.L.C.A.)) (passenger ordered out of vehicle after driver apparently stuffing
something under vehicle seat); R. v. Calderon, [2004] O.J. No. 3474, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.)
(passenger detained on speculation that vehicle was an illicit drug conveyance); R. v. Cooper,
[2005] N.S.J. No. 102, 195 C.C.C. (3d) 162, at paras. 34-46 (N.S.C.A.) (officer’s habit was to stop
vehicle, “check parties” by taking names and “check[ing] them for warrants and CPIC. . . Just a
general compliance”; passenger found to be lawfully detained after he fled from a traffic stop as under
provincial highway legislation police are entitled to question front seat passengers with “a newly
licenced driver” and therefore action of passenger consisting of act of obstruction).
72
R. v. Harris, [2007] O.J. No. 3185, 49 C.R. (6th) 220 (Ont. C.A.) (traffic stop for failure
to signal left turn, officer asked for identification from all occupants of vehicle including H. on
officer’s evidence as “just a . . . routine investigation” to see “[i]f there is anything pertinent or
anything important that these three parties will have on them or this vehicle that could involve . . .
anything from probations to recognizance, whether the vehicle was stolen or not, to numerous types
of other information, it allows us to act as police officers and enforce the laws” [at para. 8]; CPIC
check revealed H. on bail with curfew condition of which he was in breach; H. arrested for bail
breach and cocaine discovered on his person; in circumstances, H. detained in vehicle once told to
keep hands in open view; here officer took “reasonable steps . . . to assume control of the occupants
of the vehicle” [at para. 27], H.’s detention not arbitrary including after he was asked for his
identification, a request which “did not prolong or alter the nature” [at para. 26] of H.’s detention;
request for H.’s identification, though, amounting to unreasonable search breaching s. 8 of Charter).
73
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at 324 (S.C.C.); R. v. Buhay,
[2003] S.C.J. No. 30, 174 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 112 (S.C.C.); R. v. Evans, [1996] S.C.J. No. 1, 104 C.C.C.
(3d) 23, at 34 (S.C.C.).
74
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 41 (S.C.C.), the Court
specifically notes the “stop and frisk” Terry origin of investigative detention and the authority for
an incidental search where officer believes he or she is dealing with “an armed and dangerous
individual” (emphasis added). The U.S. courts have maintained adherence to the “armed and dangerous”
criteria: D.A. Harris, “Terry and the Fourth Amendment: Particularized Suspicion, Categorical
Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio” (1998)
72 St. John’s L. Rev. 975; Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, at 92-93 (1979) (“initial frisk of Ybarra
was simply not supported by a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently dangerous,
a belief which this Court has invariably held must form the predicate to a patdown of a person for
weapons”). Frequently, an officer must make “a quick decision as to how to protect himself . . .
from possible danger”: R. v. Ferris, [1998] B.C.J. No. 1415, 126 C.C.C. (3d) 298, at 316
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search power does not exist as a matter of course.75 The warrantless search
is not strictly incidental to an investigative detention but will be authorized
at common law if its purpose relates to officer safety, not discovery or
preservation of evidence,76 and it is carried out in a reasonable manner.
Such a protective search, limited to a pat-down or frisk search of the
person,77 will be justified in the sense of reasonably necessary if, in the
totality of the circumstances, the detaining officer “has reasonable grounds
to believe” that his or her safety is at risk,78 or the safety of another party
is at risk.79 The search must “be grounded in objectively discernible
facts to prevent ‘fishing expeditions’ on the basis of irrelevant or
discriminatory factors”.80
In theory, a detained suspect can consent to an extended search for
items other than weaponry where the criteria for a valid and informed
consent exist.

(B.C.C.A.) (leave to appeal refused [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 424 (S.C.C.)). “[I]t would be unreasonable
to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties”: Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, at 23.
75
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 40 (S.C.C.).
76
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at paras. 37, 41 (S.C.C.) (search
incidental to lawful investigative detention not equivalent to broader scope of search incident to
arrest; the authorized intrusion is “designed to locate weapons” (not evidence); R. c. Bitzanis, [2007]
J.Q. no 12628, at paras. 5-6 (Que. C.A.)). On occasion, as in R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32,
220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.), in the context of detention relating to possession of a weapon, the
protective search may also result in discovery of evidence relating to the initial complaint or reason
for detention. But there is no “unrestricted power to search incidental to . . . discovering evidence of
a crime”: R. v. Calderon, [2004] O.J. No. 3474, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at paras. 78-79 (Ont. C.A.).
77
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at paras. 43, 45 (S.C.C.) (pat-down
or “frisk search” the duration of which is “only a few seconds” considered relatively non-intrusive;
pat-down search to be conducted reasonably).
78
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at paras. 43, 45 (S.C.C.)
(“[R]easonable grounds to believe”, stated in two separate paragraphs, is most comfortably equated
to the reasonable grounds/reasonable and probable grounds standard. Pegged at this level, the threshold to
conduct a protective search would be more onerous than the standard to invoke the investigative
detention itself. A Crown application for a rehearing in Mann limited to clarification of the standard
of belief relating to a search incidental to an investigative detention was dismissed by a panel of six
judges without reasons (see note at [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 484 (S.C.C.)).
79
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.) founds the protective
search not only on police protection (“the interests of police officer safety” (at para. 37); police
officer’s “own safety” (at paras. 40, 43, 45); “importance of ensuring officer safety” (at para. 43))
but also, without illustration or elaboration, the protection of others (“or the safety of others . . . is at risk”
(at paras. 40, 45)). In Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, at 373-74 (1993), the Court described
the objective of a valid protective search extending to “bystanders”.
80
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 43 (S.C.C.) (decision to
search “cannot be justified on the basis of a vague or non-existent concern for safety, nor can the
search be premised upon hunches or mere intuition” (at para. 40); need for “reasonable and specific
inferences drawn from the known facts of the situation” (at para. 41)).
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Prior to instituting an investigative detention, the police do not always
possess information concerning the prospect of the detainee being armed.81
In practice, it may be that the “reasonable grounds to believe” threshold
for a search incidental to detention is a more strenuous standard in name
than in application.82
It is accepted that the rationale of a protective search is to search for
a weapon or something that might be used as a weapon. While the first
category, including guns and knives, is easy enough to understand,
the “adaptable as a weapon” category affords considerable subjective
interpretation to street officers. Does this latter category include such
mundane items as keys? In such an instance, would an officer require
reasonable belief (1) that the item is adaptable as a weapon and (2) that
the detainee may utilize the item in that manner?
The discretion to undertake a protective search of the person of the
detainee has been extended by the courts to receptacles83 and vehicles.84
81
In addressing the lower American standard of reasonable suspicion applicable to frisk
searches (Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, at 93 (1979)), S.A. Saltzburg, “Terry and the Fourth
Amendment: Marvel or Mischief? Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine” (1998) 72 St. John’s
L. Rev. 911, at 966, notes that, “One problem with reasonable suspicion as applied to frisks is that
it assumes the police have the same ability to gather information relating to a frisk as to a stop and
this assumption almost surely is false.”
82
A tension exists between a perception of objectively existing articulable facts referable
to the particular detainee as opposed to categorical assessment or application of a presumption of
armed dangerousness. In R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.), he was
reasonably suspected of involvement in a recent break and enter. The court sanctioned the existence
of reasonable grounds to believe the suspect ought to be the subject of a protective search on the
basis of a “logical possibility” (at para. 48) that he could be “in possession of break-and-enter tools,
which could be used as weapons”. This conclusion apparently assumes that unlawful entry was not
secured by manually forcing an opening, the use of a rock at the scene or the kicking of a door, and
that any entry device had not already been abandoned or dispossessed. Without explanation as to
the nature of their contribution to reasonable grounds to believe Mann was armed, the Court added
in terms of reasonable grounds for the search that the search by the two officers occurred after
midnight at a time when no one else was in the area. D.A. Harris, “Terry and the Fourth Amendment:
Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality
Under Terry v. Ohio” (1998) 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 975, at 1006 and footnotes 120-21, notes that in
the United States, “[e]ven though burglars need not carry weapons to ply their trade, a number of
courts have created an automatic frisk rule for all burglary cases on the rationale that burglars often
carry screwdrivers and other tools that they could use as weapons.” In R. v. Aguirre, [2006] O.J.
No. 5071, at para. 185 (Ont. S.C.J.), the Court held the search of the detainee justified in part on the
officer’s decision to move the detainee in a police cruiser without a protective screen between the
seats. An observation of considerable ambiguity, a bulge or bulkiness associated with a person’s
appearance, has supported a search for a weapon incidental to investigative detention: R. v. Waniandy,
[1995] A.J. No. 131, 162 A.R. 293, at para. 4 (Alta. C.A.); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
at 111-12 (1977).
83
In R. v. Peters, [2007] A.J. No. 560, 2007 ABCA 181, at paras. 7-13 (Alta. C.A.), in the
course of an investigative detention relating to suspected possession of a firearm, the police justifiably
searched the detainee’s large knapsack twice for a firearm posing a threat, discovering drugs and related
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As expected, a protective search of more than one person at the scene
raises its own problems.85
During a lawful search of a detainee, weapons unlawfully possessed
are properly seized, as are any other items, whether evidence or those
unlawfully possessed, discovered in the course of such a search. In other
words, seizures are constitutionally acceptable not only where the search
is reasonably necessary as a protective search based upon reasonable
grounds but also where the search is reasonably conducted.86
Since weapons or potential armaments are not generally openly worn
or carried, the manner by which such items, or any derivatively discovered
item of contraband or evidence, are lawfully seized by the authorities
becomes important. A pat-down search is a tactile search as the searching
officer explores the person of the detainee by touch. Until reasonable
grounds exist to believe that an item, concealed on the detainee in the
sense of not visible to the naked eye, may be a weapon, the officer is not
paraphernalia in the process. Where a detainee separates himself from his knapsack, disclaiming
any privacy interest in the receptacle, the knapsack is effectively abandoned precluding a s. 8
challenge: R. v. B. (L.), [2007] O.J. No. 3290, 2007 ONCA 596, at paras. 70-71 (Ont. C.A.); R. v.
Plummer, [2007] O.J. No. 2818, at para. 158 (Ont. S.C.J.) (search of bag); R. v. Tran, [2007] B.C.J.
No. 2341, 2007 BCCA 491, at paras. 5, 9 (B.C.C.A.) (search of fanny pack for weapons).
84
In R. v. Batzer, [2005] O.J. No. 3929, 200 C.C.C. (3d) 330 (Ont. C.A.), the officers
decided to search a vehicle following a pat-down search of the occupants looking for a gun. In a
second search of the vehicle, the police discovered cocaine and ecstasy in a zippered case in the
glove compartment. At 336-37, on the particular facts of the case, the Court agreed that “the
extended search” was unsupported by reasonable grounds. In Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366,
at 374 (1993), the Court confirmed that “in the context of a roadside encounter, where police have
reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts to believe that a driver may be armed
and dangerous, they may conduct a protective search for weapons not only of the driver’s person
but also of the passenger compartment of the vehicle.” But see R. v. Johnson, [2007] O.J. No. 5099,
at paras. 29-30 (Ont. S.C.J.) (where driver handcuffed, search of vehicle incident to det ention
unreasonable).
85
R. v. Parchment, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1281, 2007 BCCA 326, at paras. 4-11 (B.C.C.A.)
(report of P. “and a blond” dealing drugs out of a white van; police surveillance observed apparent
drug transaction conducted from white van by P., passenger “searched for weapons” and released);
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, at 218 (2000) (the second officer frisked the other two individuals at
the bus stop in company of the suspect said to have a gun — persons “against whom no allegations
had been made, and found nothing”); R. v. Peters, [2007] A.J. No. 560, 2007 ABCA 181, at para. 8
(Alta. C.A.) (P. closely fit description of a man in hotel reported to have a gun; “The police officers
were also searching another man who had been with the accused”); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85,
at 91 (1979) (“a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity
does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person”).
86
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 45 (S.C.C.). Also, in
R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at para. 104 (S.C.C.), Binnie J. observed
that “[i]f evidence of the crime emerges in the course of a valid pat-down search incidental to the
detention for the purpose of police safety, the evidence will be admissible” [emphasis omitted]. Similarly,
in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, at 373 (1993), the Court held that non -threatening
contraband or evidence could be validly seized during a lawful protective search.
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entitled to enter a suspect’s pocket.87 Intrusion beyond touch engages the
plain-feel principle, a cousin and variation of the plain-view doctrine,88
and has its own limitations.89

87

A pat-down search does not itself permit an officer searching in the detainee’s pockets
from the inside. Where, however, the feel of the outline or contours of a concealed object by its
shape, mass and hardness makes it immediately apparent that it is a weapon in the experience of the
searcher, the officer may take steps to retrieve the item from its location for visual verification and
seizure if necessary. In R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 49 (S.C.C.),
the Court noted that the officer’s decision to enter Mann’s pocket, after feeling a soft object in the
pat-down search, as “more intrusive” and “an unreasonable violation of the appellant’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of his pockets”. In R. v. Calder, [2006] A.J. No. 1303, 213 C.C.C.
(3d) 342, at 344, 346 (Alta. C.A.), the Court agreed that the officer’s search of the detainee’s
pocket, undertaken on the stated belief the bulge might be a weapon, was unreasonable having
regard to the size of the two cocaine spitballs discovered in the pocket.
88
A person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in things exposed to plain view: R. v.
Boersma, [1994] S.C.J. No. 63, 31 C.R. (4th) 386, at 387 (S.C.C.). A “central” feature of the plain
view doctrine is “a prior justification for the intrusion into the place” where the plain view occurred:
R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, 174 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 114 (S.C.C.); R. v. Longtin, [1983] O.J.
No. 3011, 5 C.C.C. (3d) 12, at 16 (Ont. C.A.). As a general rule, a legitimate plain view seizure
does not permit “an exploratory search to find other evidence”: R. v. Fawthrop, [2002] O.J. No. 2604,
166 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 115 (Ont. C.A.) (approving R. v. Spindloe, [2001] S.J. No. 266, 154 C.C.C. (3d) 8,
at 37 (Sask. C.A.). According to Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, at 374, 376 (1993) while
recognizing “the sense of touch is generally less reliable than the sense of sight”, “the sense of
touch is capable of revealing the nature of an object with sufficient reliability to support a seizure”.
However, as noted at 378, where the officer squeezed, slid and otherwise manipulated the contents
of the suspect’s pocket, he overstepped the bounds of a protective search leading to a general or
evidentiary search.
89
J.A. Cecere, “Searches Woven From Terry Cloth: How The Plain Feel Doctrine Plus
Terry Equals Pretextual Search” (1994), 36 B.C.L. Rev. 125 underlines the concern at 150, 152:
The risk is great that the plain feel doctrine will lead to far more intrusive, if not
pretextual, searches.
.....
This fundamental premise fails for most items of contraband. The varying physical characteristics
of contraband make it virtually impossible for an officer to immediately ascertain the
criminal nature of the substance, given the more cursory treatment of a patdown search.
Thus, in theory, Dickerson protects the individual because the Court requires an officer to
have probable cause before seizing an object or conducting a more extensive search. In
practice, however, an officer could not possibly gain probable cause from the mere touching
of an object through clothing. Indeed, the viewing of an object of contraband will very often
be insufficient to give rise to probable cause, because the illegal nature of the object may not
be immediately apparent. Touching in the context of a protective search is inherently less
reliable than viewing. While a law enforcement officer normally would view the contraband
itself, he or she could only touch it through clothing. In addition, the identification of an
object detected through the sense of touch is open to a wider range of interpretation than if
detected through the sense of sight. Thus, …the plain feel doctrine in the context of a cursory
patdown search has great potential for error.
This potential for misinterpretation, along with a zealous police officer’s desire to
establish probable cause to justify a seizure, will inevitably lead to more intrusive searches
than permitted by Terry. Moreover, to approve the use of evidence of some offense unrelated
to weapons would be to invite the use of weapon searches as a pretext for unwarranted searches,
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A search incidental to a lawful arrest may, in some circumstances,
precede the arrest itself.90 The danger exists of an officer cascading through
a groundless investigative detention to an arrest supported only by
information arising from the detention until after the arrest itself. Grounds
for arrest arising from an unconstitutional investigative detention or from
an unreasonable search incident to a lawful investigative detention cannot
afford valid grounds for arrest.91

IV. EXERCISE OF ADDITIONAL POWERS
The exercise of investigatory duties by the police does not translate
to a police officer’s powers being “unlimited”. 92 The detaining officer
seeks to quickly confirm or dispel her or his suspicions during a brief
investigative detention. The primary investigative technique is questioning
the detainee.93
An officer’s questions to an individual investigatively detained may
themselves amount to a warrantless search within a section 8 Charter
context.94
and thus to severely erode the protection of the Fourth Amendment. (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis of original)
90
R. v. Debot, [1989] S.C.J. No. 118, 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 207 (S.C.C.); R. v. Dubois,
[2004] B.C.J. No. 2426, 205 B.C.A.C. 156, at para. 10 (B.C.C.A.).
91
On occasion, an accused will argue that the police employed the “pretense of an investigative
detention to search him for evidence to justify an arrest”: see, for example, R. v. Parchment, [2007]
B.C.J. No. 1281, 2007 BCCA 326, at para. 36 (B.C.C.A.).
92
R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, 20 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 120 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mann,
[2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at 324 (S.C.C.) (“Police powers and police duties are
not necessarily correlative”; police are “not empowered to undertake any and all action in the
exercise of that duty”); U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, at 714 (1983) (Terry stops “do not provide the
police with a commission to employ whatever investigative techniques they deem appropriate”);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, at 499 (1985) (“Nor may the police seek to verify their suspicions
by means that approach the conditions of arrest”).
93
As noted in R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at 40 (Ont. C.A.)
(leave to appeal granted [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.)), “Persons who are detained for
investigative purposes are usually questioned”; “Asking questions is an essential part of police
investigations”: Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177, at 185 (2004).
94
In R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 100, 76 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at 487-88, 490 (S.C.C.),
the officer’s questions were “elements of a search” as they fell outside the scope of the lawful
reason for the detention and were not based on reasonable and probable grounds leading to
“compelled testimony” contravening s. 8. In R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482,
at 506 (Ont. C.A.), the Court concluded that a search of the vehicle driver commenced “when the
appellant was initially questioned by the police officer” in the absence of articulable cause for the
detention. Similarly, in R. v. Young, [1997] O.J. No. 2431, 116 C.C.C. (3d) 350, at 358 (Ont. C.A.),
the court held that the police questions of a detained suspect constituted an unreasonable search
because the officer acted on a hunch or mere suspicion of the suspect’s involvement in a break and
enter. In R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 209 C.C.C. (3d) 250, at 264-65 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to
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appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 99 (S.C.C.)), after noting that “[t]he divide between questions
that begin a search and questions that do not is sometimes not easy to draw”, the Court observed
that in R. v. Young, R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 100, 76 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) and R. v.
Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.) “when the police asked the crucial
questions, they had already formed the intention to conduct a search, as evidenced by the specificity
of the questions they asked”. The Court in Grant considered, in that case, that “the nature of the police’s
question [“if he had anything he shouldn’t”] did not go that far and . . . was asked in quite a different
context”. In R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at 556-57 (Alta. C.A.), the
accused’s argument that police questioning constituted a search stumbled on the facts as R. was told
he was free to go at any time. In R. v. Harris, [2007] O.J. No. 3185, 49 C.R. (6th) 220 (Ont. C.A.),
a majority of the Court found H. was subjected to a search within the scope of s. 8 when, as a
passenger in a vehicle stopped by the police, not suspected of any wrongdoing, he was questioned.
At paras. 34, 38-44, the Court stated:
Answers to police questions may or may not give rise to a s. 8 claim. As with other
aspects of the s. 8 inquiry, a fact-specific examination of the circumstances is necessary.
Where the subject of the questioning is under police detention and reasonably believes that
he or she is compelled to provide the information sought in the questions, I do not think it
distorts the concept of a seizure to describe the receipt of the information by the police as a
non-consensual taking of that information from the detained person.
.....
. . . [I]n the present case, Harris was under police detention. Lipkus was not asking Harris to
identify himself out of some sense of curiosity or so he could greet Harris by name should
they meet again. Lipkus had a very specific purpose in mind when he asked for identification.
He intended to use that identification to access a wealth of personal information about
Harris before allowing Harris to proceed on his way. That information included whether Harris
had a criminal record, was subject to any outstanding court orders and, if so, the terms of
those orders. Although Crown counsel submits that the officer’s request for identification
was “not directed at obtaining incriminating information in relation to unrelated criminal
conduct”, I think that was precisely one of the reasons Lipkus asked Harris for identification.
Why else would Lipkus use the identification to determine whether Harris was in breach of
any outstanding court orders?
Given the information readily available to Lipkus through CPIC, I see no functional
difference between Lipkus asking Harris to identify himself and then checking that identification
through CPIC, and Lipkus asking Harris a series of questions about his criminal past, his
bail status, and the terms of any bail that Harris might be under. Lipkus’s immediate access
to information available on CPIC made Lipkus’s request for identification the equivalent of
Lipkus asking Harris whether he was breaching any court orders at that moment.
A person under police detention who is being asked to incriminate himself has more
than a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the answers to any questions that
are put to him by the police. That person has a right to silence unless he or she makes an
informed decision to waive that right and provide the requested information to the police:
R. v. Hebert (1990), 57 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). In the circumstances, Harris’s identification
in response to the officer’s question constitutes a seizure and attracts s. 8 protection. 2
2
Section 7 of the Charter was not argued. It may be that on these facts the appellant’s
claim could be more easily assessed as a self-incrimination claim under s. 7. Whether
the claim is made under s. 7, the broad description of an individual’s legal rights, or s. 8,
one of the specific examples of those rights, the essentials are the same. Individuals are
entitled to be left alone by the state absent justification for state interference. Could the
state justify compelling Harris to provide information to an agent of the state to be used
by that agent to investigate Harris?
The seizure was unreasonable. As in Mellenthin, Lipkus had no reason to suspect Harris
of anything when he questioned him and requested his identification. The purpose for the
stop and the consequential detention of Harris and the other occupants of the vehicle had
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A detained suspect is not obliged to respond to questioning.95 As a
matter of common sense, a detained suspect is more likely than an
undetained person to believe she or he is compelled to respond to police
questioning. While the police are under no obligation to inform the
detainee of his or her right to remain silent, there must be compliance
with the section 10(a)96 and section 10(b)97 Charter rights.
nothing to do with the request for Harris’s identification. The purpose of the stop did not
justify an at large inquiry into Harris’s background or his status in the criminal justice system.
That was the effect of the request for identification. Just as in Mellenthin, Lipkus expanded
a Highway Traffic Act stop into a broader and unrelated inquiry. Harris’s identification of
himself provided the entrée into that broader and unrelated inquiry.
.....
Grafe and the other cases, however, turn largely on the finding that the person who was
asked for identification was not under police detention or any other form of compulsion to
answer the request for identification. If, as in this case, a request for identification is made
in circumstances of detention in which the detained individual reasonably feels compelled
to answer the request for identification, then the question assumes a coercive quality in the
nature of a demand, which suggests a state seizure of the response: see Mellenthin, supra;
R. v. Young (1997), 116 C.C.C. (3d) 350 (Ont. C.A.).
The Crown also relies on R. v. Grant (2006), 209 C.C.C. (3d) 250 at 264-65 (Ont.
C.A.). Grant recognized that some questioning will constitute a search for the purposes of s.
8 and other questioning will not. Laskin J.A. pointed out that the nature of the questions and
the context in which those questions were asked are important considerations in determining
whether the questions constituted a search. On his analysis, it was important to consider whether
the question was, in the minds of the police, preliminary to a more detailed search. In the
present case, when Lipkus asked for identification, he intended to use that identification to
conduct a CPIC search, one of the purposes of which was to determine whether the appellant
was under any court orders and in breach of any court orders. I think the officer’s intention
to use Harris’s identification to make the various inquiries available through CPIC is akin to
an intention to conduct a further more intrusive search after receiving the answer to the request
for identification. Grant offers support for my conclusion that the request for identification
in the circumstances of this case amounted to a search or seizure for the purposes of s. 8.
I conclude that Harris was subject to a seizure when he gave Lipkus his identification.
The seizure was warrantless and without reasonable cause.
95
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 45 (S.C.C.); Hiibel v.
Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177, at 192-93 (2004) per Stevens J. (dissenting in the result)
(“It is a ‘settled principle’ that ‘the police have the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily
questions concerned unsolved crimes’ but ‘they have not right to compel them to answer’”).
However, the driver of a vehicle is generally required to identify himself or herself by regulatory
legislation: R. v. Moore, [1978] S.C.J. No. 82, 43 C.C.C. (2d) 83, at 86 (S.C.C.).
96
In R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 21 (S.C.C.), the Court
stated that, “At a minimum, individuals who are detained for investigative purposes must therefore
be advised, in clear and simple language, of the reasons for the detention”; R. v. Nguyen, [2008]
O.J. No. 219, 2008 ONCA 49, at paras. 11-22 (Ont. C.A.) (here obligation of police to comply with
s. 10(a) “easy to fill” — the officer could easily have said, “Police, stop, we’re investigating a
marijuana grow op in this house” to driver of vehicle turning into driveway at time of execution of
search warrant). In R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.), the detainee
was told there had been a gun complaint. In R. v. Calderon, [2004] O.J. No. 3474, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 481
(Ont. C.A.), the suspect was informed that he was under investigative detention for trafficking. In
R. v. Aguirre, [2006] O.J. No. 5071, at para. 182 (Ont. S.C.J.), the Court observed: “J.A. Nicol,

204

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)

In an investigative detention, the police officer is generally in an
adversarial position vis-à-vis the detainee as the officer seeks confirmation
that the suspect is the person involved in the subject criminality — in
effect, making an effort to top up reasonable suspicion to reasonable
grounds to make an arrest. There is, therefore, a situational incentive for
the police to provide the suspect less, rather than more, information about
the transaction under investigation as the investigator’s questions attempt
to draw out information about the suspect’s recent whereabouts, association
with others, route, etc., committing the detainee to an account for evaluation
against the officer’s possessed and incoming information.
A suspect who is detained within the meaning of section 10(b) must
be given the right to counsel upon detention.98 Compliance with section
10(b) “cannot be transformed into an excuse for prolonging, unduly and
artificially, a detention that . . . must be of brief duration”.99 In some
instances, the police may communicate the section 10(b) rights to a
detained suspect at the outset of investigative detention with failure to

‘“Stop in the Name of the Law”: Investigative Detention’ (2002), 7 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 223 at
p. 244, in my view correctly observes that ‘in rapidly developing situations on the street, it would
be unreasonable to expect police [to] provide the suspect with precise and comprehensive details as
to why they are being detained’ . . . the primary benefit of the s. 10(a) communication [is] to permit
an informed decision as to whether to exercise the s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel (R. v. Latimer,
(1997), 112 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.), at 205; R. v. Schmautz [[1990] S.C.J. No. 21, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 556
(S.C.C.)] at p. 560 . . .”). Quite apart from providing appreciation of his or her jeopardy, in the
words used to communicate the s. 10(a) right, it should be made clear that the officer is not simply
chatting with the suspect but that he is detained and not free to leave until released: see A. Fiszauf,
“Articulating Cause – Investigative Detention and Its Implications” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 327,
at 336-37. Ambiguity in this regard will fail to alert the detainee to his or her predicament respecting
escape, resistance, obstruction or assault and may well defeat prosecution.
97
In R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 22 (S.C.C.), a case where
there was no communication of the s. 10(b) right, after noting that s. 10(b) must be purposively
interpreted, the Court left to another day the question of the need for compliance with s. 10(b)
during a brief investigative detention. In R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at 42
(Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.)), the Court held that a detainee
is to be afforded his or her s. 10(b) Charter right after a “brief interlude” has passed since the invocation of
investigative detention. In the United States, with Miranda [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)]
rights vesting on custodial detention, the counsel issue does not arise in the context of a stop and frisk.
In R. v. Suberu, at 45, without deciding the issue, the Court raised the prospect of self-incriminatory
statements of a detainee given prior to communication of the s. 10(b) Charter right being excluded,
other than to explain subsequent police conduct, to prevent unfairness (“The force of that argument
would depend on the entirety of the circumstances surrounding the detention and taking of the
statements. Factors such as the nature of the detention, the kinds of questions asked, and the age of
the detained person would be among the relevant considerations.” [at para. 61]).
98
R. v. Debot, [1989] S.C.J. No. 118, 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 211-12 (S.C.C.); R. v. MacEachern,
[2007] N.S.J. No. 245, 221 C.C.C. (3d) 321, at para. 19 (N.S.C.A.).
99
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308, at para. 22 (S.C.C.).
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do so breaching the detainee’s right to counsel.100 Other authority has
decided that a contextual and purposive application of section 10(b), and
specifically the words of the text of the constitutional right, “without delay”,
does not require a detaining officer to immediately communicate the
right to counsel during the “brief interlude between the commencement of
an investigative detention” and the cessation of the “brief”101 detention
permitted in a Mann102 investigative detention.103 This approach, either
through the interpretation of the “without delay” mandate of section 10(b),
or perhaps at some point through a section 1 Charter justification, defers
the section 10(b) right. Although the Court in Suberu104 recognized that
100
R. v. Lewis, [1998] O.J. No. 376, 122 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at para. 28 (Ont. C.A.); R. v.
Greaves, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1953, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 305, at paras. 82-85 (B.C.C.A.) (leave to appeal
refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 522 (S.C.C.)); R. v. Campbell, [2003] M.J. No. 207, 175 C.C.C. (3d) 452,
at paras. 44-52 (Man. C.A.).
101
R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at para. 50 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to
appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.)) (delay of one-half hour “is beyond the limits of
the ‘without delay’ requirement” [at para. 54]); R. v. Gurung, [2007] O.J. No. 4231, at paras. 25-29
(Ont. S.C.J.) (55-minute roadside detention breaching s. 9 Charter right); R. v. Schrenk, [2007] M.J.
No. 154, 2007 MBQB 93, at para. 27 (Man. Q.B.) (an eight-minute detention was “brief”). In R. v.
Aguirre, [2006] O.J. No. 5071 (Ont. S.C.J.), on the issue of “brief” detention, the court stated at
paras. 189-91:
Beyond the admonition that an investigative detention must be “brief” to retain its
constitutional status, the courts have declined bright line temporal rules: U.S. v. Place, at
p. 709 (“we question the wisdom of a rigid time limitation”; “we decline to adopt any
outside time limitation for a permissible Terry stop”); U.S. v. Sharpe, at p. 685 (per Burger C.J.,
“. . . our cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry stops”; no outside limit of 20 min.;
and at p. 697 per Marshall J., “. . . Terry’s brevity requirement is not judged by a stopwatch
but rather by the facts of particular stops”).
I agree with the observations of J.A. Nicol, “‘Stop in the Name of the Law’: Investigative
Detention”, at p. 232 that “the facts will play a pivotal role in determining the flexibility of
any temporal restrictions” including the seriousness and complexity of the crime(s) being
investigated. Resort to caselaw examples is at best rough guidance as to the constitutionally
tolerable duration of the temporary restraint of an investigative detention: R. v. Greaves,
at pp. 324-7 (40-min. detention not violating s. 9 of the Charter); R. v. Willis, at para. 31
(questioning for a few minutes was justifiable”); R. v. Scott (2005), 191 C.C.C. (3d) 183
(N.S.C.A.) at paras. 6, 35 (leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 24) (approximate
30-min. investigative detention not unreasonable); R. v. Dupuis, [1994] A.J. No. 1011
(C.A.) at paras. 9-10 (1-hr. detention upheld; police may detain “for a reasonable duration of
time”); U.S. Tavolacci, at p. 1427 (10-to-15 min. delay for canine to arrive not unreasonable).
In assessing the permissible length of the detention, the court may “take into account
whether the police diligently pursue[d] their investigation”: U.S. v. Place, at p. 709; U.S. v.
Sharpe, at p. 687 (per Burger C.J., no “delay unnecessary to the legitimate investigation” by
the police).
102
R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, 185 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.).
103
R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at paras. 41-42, 50-51 (Ont. C.A.)
(leave to appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.)); R. v. Peters, [2007] A.J. No. 560,
2007 ABCA 181, at para. 15 (Alta. C.A.).
104
R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal
allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.)).
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at the conclusion of a “brief detention” “the officer will either have to
release the individual or, if reasonable and probable grounds exist, arrest
the individual”, as investigative detention “is not an arrest and cannot be
treated as a de facto arrest by the police or by the courts”,105 the Court
twice speaks of an officer not being obliged to communicate the section
10(b) right while he or she makes up his or her mind whether “the detained
person will be detained for something more than a brief interval.”106 It is
unclear whether this latter language envisions a brief interval within a
brief detention.
Beyond the protective search of a detainee and the investigative
technique of exploratory or accusatory questioning, police officers effecting
investigative detention at times exercise other powers, some protective
in nature,107 others investigatory.108 These powers ought not to be as
105

R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at para. 40 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to
appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.)).
106
R. v. Suberu, [2007] O.J. No. 317, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 27, at paras. 50, 54 (Ont. C.A.)
(leave to appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 150 (S.C.C.)).
107

(1) illumination of vehicle interior — In R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 100, 76 C.C.C.
(3d) 481, at 487 (S.C.C.), in the context of a check-stop program at night, the Court
considered that an officer’s use of a flashlight was “necessarily incidental” to the lawful
vehicle stop and occupants’ detention as “essential for the protection of those on duty”.
(2) opening vehicle door — Vehicle stopped for speeding; driver unable to produce licence,
insurance and vehicle registration when asked; driver claimed vehicle belonged to a
friend; officer suspected vehicle might be stolen so ran computer check of plates;
officer unsuccessfully searched glove compartment for ownership or registration; officer
opened back door of stopped car to ask passenger to identify herself; held: the officer
“had the right to open the back door and look into the rear of the vehicle for safety
reasons and to speak with the passenger in the back seat” (R. v. Belnavis, [1997] S.C.J.
No. 81, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 405, at 421 (S.C.C.)).
(3) direction to driver to exit vehicle — Vehicle stopped on account of expired licence
plate; police intention to issue traffic summons; driver asked to step out of vehicle
and produce owner’s card and operator’s licence; only when driver out and standing
did officer have reason to suspect detainee armed; .38-calibre handgun seized in ensuing
search; held: police direction to exit vehicle an “incremental intrusion” of a “de minimis”
nature necessary out of “legitimate concerns for the officer’s safety” (Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, at 109-11 (1977)). See also R. v. Lal, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2446,
130 C.C.C. (3d) 413, at 418 (B.C.C.A.) (leave to appeal refused [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 28
(S.C.C.)); R. v. Johnson, [2007] O.J. No. 5099, at para. 3 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Plummer,
[2007] O.J. No. 2818, at para. 49 (Ont. S.C.J.).
(4) direction regarding detainee’s hands — Commonly, the police direct a detainee to
keep his or her hands clearly exposed during the investigative encounter (R. v. Clayton,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at paras. 7, 10 (S.C.C.) — detainee
instructed to turn around and place hands on top of car; R. v. Harris, [2007] O.J. No. 3185,
49 C.R. (6th) 220, at paras. 20, 27 (Ont. C.A.) — occupants of stopped vehicle directed
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to keep hands where officer could see them; R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 209 C.C.C.
(3d) 250, at 254, 261-62 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 99
(S.C.C.)) — detainee pedestrian told to keep his hands in front of him); R. v. Tran,
[2007] B.C.J. No. 2341, 2007 BCCA 491, at paras. 2, 9 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Iraheta, [2007]
O.J. No. 2205, at paras. 30, 32 (Ont. S.C.J.) (show hands, direction to take hands out
of pockets); R. v. Ismail, [2007] O.J. No. 3851, at paras. 6, 12 (Ont. S.C.J.) (order to
remove hands from pockets); R. v. Williams, [2007] O.J. No. 4305, at paras. 9-10
(Ont. S.C.J.) (detainee advised to keep hands out of pockets)).
(5) physical restraint — Handcuffing of detainee (R. v. Parchment, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1281,
2007 BCCA 326, at para. 10 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Batzer, [2005] O.J. No. 3929, 200 C.C.C.
(3d) 330, at 336 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Greaves, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1953, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 305,
at 316, 327-28 (B.C.C.A.) (leave to appeal refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 522 (S.C.C.));
J.A. Nicol, “‘Stop in the Name of the Law’: Investigative Detention” (2002) 7 Can.
Crim. L. Rev. 233 (having recognized authority to investigatively detain, it would be
“unreasonable if police were not able to physically restrain a suspect if necessary”);
R. v. Gurr, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1480, 2007 BCSC 979, at para. 28 (B.C.S.C.) (even if
detainee handcuffed, pat-down search may not be inappropriate); R. v. Johnson, [2007]
O.J. No. 5099, at paras. 20, 28 (Ont. S.C.J.) (perhaps handcuffs necessary)).
(6) seizure of cell phone — During investigative detention detainee speaking on his cell
phone saying to unknown third party that the police were present; officer seized cell
phone; seizure justified to prevent detainee summoning “back -up forces”; police
“were entitled to take preventative measures” (R. v. White, [2007] O.J. No. 1605, 2007
ONCA 318, at paras. 39, 45, 47-49, 53 (Ont. C.A.)).
(7) movement of detainee — Can police require detainee to sit in cruiser? (J. Stribopoulos,
“The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention After Mann”
(2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299, at 309).
(8) pursuit to detain — Where reasonable grounds to detain and suspect flees, police
“had the right to pursue him” (R. v. Wainwright, [1999] O.J. No. 3539, at para. 1
(Ont. C.A.)).
(9) use of force — During an on-foot pursuit, the suspect attempted to conceal himself
beneath a parked car; the officer was concerned that the suspect was armed and the
officer was therefore disinclined to climb under the car; the officer elected to kick the
prone suspect in the chest to gain control of the suspect; held: “application of situational
force designed to dissolve a potential risk” to officer safety (R. v. Yum, [2001] A.J.
No. 365, at paras. 4, 6-8 (Alta. C.A.)).
(10) asking if weapon(s) present — Where police saw a knife, lawfully possessed and visible
in the front seat of the vehicle, police asked a passenger whether there were other
weapons in vehicle (R. v. Gurung, [2007] O.J. No. 4231, at para. 8 (Ont. S.C.J.)).
(11) movement of clothing — In circumstances, detainee told to lift front of hoodie to
expose waistband as weapons often concealed there (R. v. Williams, [2007] O.J. No. 4305
at para. 10 (Ont. S.C.J.)).
108
Measures apparently incidental to investigative questioning include:
(1) request for detainee’s identification — As noted at footnote 94, a detained suspect,
other than a vehicle driver, cannot be compelled to identify himself or herself. It may
be that a “stop and identify” legislative initiative as an adjunct to investigative detention
would pass constitutional scrutiny (Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S.
177, at 182-89 (2004)). See also R. v. Ismail, [2007] O.J. No. 3851, at paras. 23-28,
42-43 (Ont. S.C.J.) (where discrepancy between driver’s identification and police
information as to registered owner, reasonable to ask driver for passenger’s name).
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invasive as the circumstances of an arrest. Often the case law reporting
the exercise of these ancillary powers is simply as part of the context or
narrative of the facts, without any consideration of the appropriateness of
their application or whether, beyond reasonableness, some threshold
of belief must first exist before implementation of the particular measure.

V. CONCLUSION
Experts will undoubtedly continue to debate whether the courts ought
to have left the subject of investigative detention to Parliament. But
whether or not the judiciary should have exercised common law authority
(2) moving the detainee — suspect touched on elbow and directed to side of train station
(R. v. MacEachern, [2007] N.S.J. No. 245, 221 C.C.C. (3d) 321, at para. 8 (N.S.C.A.)).
In R. v. Aguirre, [2006] O.J. No. 5071, at paras. 187-88 (Ont. S.C.J.), the Court upheld a
45-second cruiser ride back to the crime scene as tolerably incidental to an investigative
detention:
This minimal movement of the detainee is qualitatively different than transport to
a police facility — conduct converting an investigative detention to unconstitutional
detention: Florida v. Hayes [460 U.S. 491 (1985)], at p. 815. There is no per se
prohibition of movement of a detainee provided it is necessary in the sense of
rationally in furtherance of the objective of the detention itself: R. v. Lewis,
(1998), 122 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 190 (decision to move detainee from
airport concourse to nearby private room “appropriate”); R. v. Elshaw (1989),
70 C.R. (3d) 197 (B.C.C.A) at pp. 203-4 (reasonable to move detainee from park
to rear of patrol wagon (rev’d on right to counsel issue (1991), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 97
(S.C.C.) with court stating at p. 126, “It may have been reasonable and necessary
to place the accused in the patrol wagon”)); L.A. McCoy, “Some Answers from
the Supreme Court on Investigative Detention . . . and Some More Questions”
(2004), 49 C.L.Q. 268 at p. 276 (“. . . all but the most minimal transfers would
defeat the goal of investigative detentions being brief and non-intrusive”); U.S. v.
Place [462 U.S. 696 (1983)], at 715 (during the course of stop, “the suspect must
not be moved or asked to move more than a short distance”); Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 504 (1983) (per White J., safety and security concerns may justify
“moving a suspect from one location to another during an investigative detention”);
U.S. v. Sharpe [470 U.S. 675 (1985)], at p. 692 (per Marshall J., “A stop can be
unduly intrusive if the individual is moved . . . more than a short distance”); U.S.
v. Tavolacci [895 F.2d 1423 (2nd Cir. 1990)], (movement of detainee not
unreasonable — “Nor does the change of location from the train to the platform
entail a full-fledged arrest”).
(3) subjecting detainee to identification procedure — Subjecting detained suspect to
identification by eyewitnesses upheld in R. v. Aguirre, [2006] O.J. No. 5071, at para.
187 (Ont. S.C.J.) (“The identification procedure was essential to determining whether
Mr. Aguirre was the intruder or whether the perimeter of police officers should
remain active. Elimination of a detainee is an important aspect of a brief investigative
detention: U.S. v. Place, [462 U.S. 696 (1983)], at 702 (action ‘that would quickly
confirm or dispel the authorities’ suspicion’); U.S. v. Sharpe [470 U.S. 675 (1985)], at
p. 686 per Burger C.J. (whether officer chose ‘a means of investigation that was
likely to confirm or dispel . . . suspicions quickly’”).
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to fashion such a power for the police, and despite the cogent arguments
for and against the existence of such a power, investigative detention as
a police power has survived transplantation from the United States.
The courts have an established penchant for eschewing “bright-line”
rules in favour of broad discretion applied contextually on a case-by-case
basis and according to general guiding principles including the overarching
requirements of Charter compliance.109 An advantage is that no case suffers
an apparent arbitrary fate in the application of a one-size-fits-all rule
which adequately covers the majority of situations faced by the police,
but not all.
However, pride in avoidance of bright-line rules is surely warranted
only where the courts provide, as a surrogate, tolerable clarity and certainty
in the law.110 Establishment of police powers which are uncertain or
ambiguous risks greater injustice than implementation of a bright-line
rule.111
In street policing, officers need to make quick decisions and to
remain responsive to changing information. In such a dynamic and fluid
environment, a police officer needs to know and be able to apply clear
109
Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality) Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274, 131 C.C.C.
(3d) 1, at para. 62 (Ont. C.A.) (notice of discontinuance filed after leave to appeal granted [1999]
S.C.C.A. No. 87 (S.C.C.)) (where competing interests in each situation, it is “difficult, if not impossible,
to provide preformulated bright-line rules which appropriately maintain the balance between police
powers and individual liberties”); R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2179, 209 C.C.C. (3d) 250, at 257
(Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 99 (S.C.C.) (although “[b]right-line rules
. . . have the advantage of certainty”, bright-line rules “ill-suited” to addressing the myriad of
circumstances in police/citizen encounters).
110
R. v. Belnavis, [1997] S.C.J. No. 81, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 405, at 433 (S.C.C.) (La Forest J.
dissenting in the result) (“The police are entitled to as clear a standard as possible so as to guide
them in the performance of their . . . work”); R. v. Landry, [1986] S.C.J. No. 10, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 1,
at 30 (S.C.C.) (La Forest J. dissenting in the result) (police “need the clearest possible rules” in
enforcement endeavours); J. Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative
Detention After Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299, at 314 (on the subject of investigative detention
and the public, the police, lawyers and judges, “All four constituencies desire clarity, albeit for
different reasons”); Brown v. Durham (Regional Municipality) Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 5274,
131 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at para. 62 (Ont. C.A.) (notice of discontinuance filed after leave to appeal
granted [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 87 (S.C.C.)) (“clear and readily discernible rules governing the extent
to which the police can interfere with individual liberties are most desirable”).
111
R. v. Belnavis, [1997] S.C.J. No. 81, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 405, at 433 (S.C.C.) (“a vague standard
. . . offers almost no protection to the citizen from interference by the police”); R. v. Landry, [1986]
S.C.J. No. 10, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 30 (S.C.C.) (problematic to provide the police “a very vague rule
for action”); J. Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention
After Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299, at 304 (uncertainty is incompatible with the stated goal of
regulating investigative detention as a low-visibility encounter); A. Fiszauf, “Articulating Cause –
Investigative Detention and Its Implications” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 327, at 336 (vague criteria for
detention is troublesome for police acting in good faith in performance of their duties and vagueness
inadvertently legitimizes many detentions as a practical matter).
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rules almost automatically. There is no time to “grapple . . . with
complexities”112 in the law. Unfortunately, many of the limits relating to
investigative detentions and related searches and field interrogations
remain entirely uncertain. Granted, the characterization of detainees as
warrantlessly seized may not achieve significantly enhanced clarity and
fairness. But the approach should not be rejected out of hand. Indeed, if
the courts do not soon achieve greater certainty respecting investigative
detention, then the words of La Forest J. may, at some point, become a
reality: “It would be an ironic reversal of roles if Parliament was required
to act to protect . . . from possible excesses flowing from the application
of a judicially created rule.”113

112
J. Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention
After Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299, at 314.
113
R. v. Landry, [1986] S.C.J. No. 10, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 31 (S.C.C.).

